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Adolescent refusal of MMR inoculation: F (Mother) v F (Father)  
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Abstract 
F (Mother) v F (Father) concerned a dispute between parents as to whether or not a 15 and 
11 year old should receive the MMR inoculation. Mrs Justice Theis took into consideration 
the wishes of both parents and the two ‘intelligent, articulate and thoughtful’ minors and 
held that inoculation was in their best interests. The troubled history of the MMR vaccine 
and its importance to the public health provided the backdrop. Whilst the court’s efforts to 
establish the views of the minors are to be commended, the decision is problematic in its 
assessment of the minors’ individual medical interests; of their individual capacities; and in 
the significance placed on their views when determining whether inoculation would be in 
their best interests.  
The Facts 
Measles, mumps and rubella are highly contagious, untreatable viral diseases that can have 
serious, sometimes fatal effects. Incidence is vastly reduced by vaccination. The NHS offers a 
combined MMR vaccination in two courses. The first is usually given before the child’s first 
birthday and the second between the child’s third and fifth birthdays. In F (Mother) v F 
(Father)1 a recently divorced father wanted his two daughters L and M, aged 15 and 11 
respectively, to receive the MMR vaccine. As a baby, L was given the first course, but no 
booster. M had not received either course.  
The parents had been influenced by widely held concerns about the safety of the vaccine 
that emerged shortly after L received the first course. These concerns were later allayed to 
the satisfaction of the father,2 but the mother and daughters continued to reject 
inoculation. Section 2(7) of the Children Act 1989 enables a person with parental 
responsibility to provide sole consent. However, even if the father had been able to find 
doctors willing to carry out the inoculation in the face of the minors’ objections, parental 
dispute about immunisation is one of a small group of decisions that parents cannot take 
unilaterally.3 The father therefore applied to the court for a specific issue order that both 
daughters receive the MMR vaccination. Mrs F, the mother, opposed the application.  
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Mrs Justice Theis established that the paramount consideration is the welfare of the minors, 
applying the welfare checklist in section 1(3) of the Children Act 1989.4 Having met with L 
and M and found them ‘charming, intelligent, articulate and thoughtful’5 and consulted 
reports to determine the views of the minors and parents, Theis J made a declaration that it 
was in the interests of L and M to receive the vaccination and set a deadline.6 
The context 
Measles, mumps and rubella present a worldwide public health issue. A global vaccination 
campaign has led to a 71% drop in measles-related deaths between 2000 and 2011, making 
a huge impact on the estimated 2.6 million deaths per year in the 1980s.7 Though often a 
mild condition, rubella infection during pregnancy can cause a range of foetal health 
problems and result in birth defects. Mumps is also generally mild, but can result in serious 
complications such as viral meningitis and fertility problems.  In the UK, the incidence of all 
three diseases has been much reduced since the introduction of the triple (MMR) vaccine in 
1988. The vaccine comprises weakened viruses that trigger the production of antibodies. 
Though usually given to young children, it can also be given to older children and adults. 
L and M’s parents, like many other parents at the time, decided against inoculating their 
young children due to safety concerns identified in a paper published in the Lancet8 and 
much publicised by the media.9 At first, the risks posed to the un-inoculated were negligible.   
People were unlikely to come into contact with the diseases due the success of the 
vaccination programme. However, as increasing numbers of parents rejected the 
vaccination, herd immunity was reduced. In 2013, reports of an outbreak of measles in 
Swansea10 resulted in a national NHS campaign focusing on the inoculation of older 
children.11  
Criticism on a number of counts eventually led to the retraction of the Lancet paper.12 The 
NHS promotes the safety and efficacy of the vaccine.13 Yet despite the public health 
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benefits, the Department of Health has not yielded to calls for ‘incentives’, such as making 
the payment of benefits conditional on inoculation.14 Instead it has steadfastly maintained a 
policy of voluntary inoculation.15  
Theis J’s judgment in this case aligns with the public health agenda, which emphasises that 
MMR inoculation is in the best interests of children both individually and as a group. 
However, Theis J does not (at least overtly) rely on the public policy arguments to justify her 
decision. In fact, Theis J was keen in a previous parental inoculation dispute case, LCC v A, B, 
C and D,16 to show that ‘policy dogma’ was not a relevant consideration.17 
It is clear, therefore, that the decision in F (Mother) v F (Father) should turn on the best 
interests of L and M and not on the wider policy considerations.18 Whatever the moral 
responsibilities of L and M, their parents and parents generally to do their part in protecting 
the public health, this was not the concern of the court in this case.  
The relevance of parental views in determining best interests 
Whilst the Children Act checklist in section 1(3) sets down a number of considerations 
relevant to welfare, they are broadly framed and in no particular order of priority. It is 
unsurprising therefore that there is a lack of certainty surrounding the definition of ‘welfare’ 
and that the court is frequently called upon to arbitrate ‘best interests’ disputes.  
The court has the power to override the views of parents whose views do not accord with 
the welfare of the child. In The NHS Trust v A Holman J stated: 
[Parental wishes] are wholly irrelevant to consideration of the objective best 
interests of the child save to the extent in any given case that they may illuminate 
the quality and value to the child of the child/parent relationship.19  
This and other relevant cases20 lead the Nuffield Council on Bioethics to recommend that 
vaccination against the wishes of parents may sometimes be acceptable, with the proviso 
that: ‘in relation to vaccination [of incompetent minors] in the face of parental refusal, a risk 
of serious harm would have to be demonstrated’.21  
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The case in hand poses a number of dilemmas. It is not clear that the minors were 
incompetent or that the risk of harm to L and M could be categorised as ‘serious’. These 
issues will be considered in the next subsections. In this section it is pertinent to consider 
the relevance of the parental views, taking into consideration the fact that both might be 
considered ‘reasonable’ on the basis that the Department of Health recommends childhood 
vaccination but does not deem the risk to individual or public health sufficient that it be 
mandatory. 
In LCC v A, B, C and D,22 care proceedings had been initiated in respect to four children (aged 
13, 9, 6 and 5) on the basis of neglect. The parents believed that their eldest child’s autism 
was a result of the MMR and did not want him to receive a booster injection or for the other 
children to be immunised at all. They relied on the fact that around 12% of parents shared 
their concerns and rejected the MMR.23 The parents shared parental responsibility with the 
local authority, which wanted the children to receive the vaccinations. Theis J gave 
consideration, ‘in particular, to the understandable views of the parents’24 but said:  
Nevertheless they should be weighed in the light of an almost complete failure by 
the parents to co-operate with health professionals and a neglect of the children's 
health. In respect of the link between autism and the MMR, they rely on discredited 
research.25 
Theis J found the parental views to be ‘understandable’ but not necessarily reasonable. In F 
(Mother) v F (Father) there is no such evidence of neglect. However, the reasonableness of 
either or both parental views does not prevent Theis J from coming to an independent 
decision on best interests. This was made clear in Re Z (A Minor) (Identification: Restrictions 
on Publication)26 where Sir Thomas Bingham MR said: 
[The parental decision] should certainly not be disregarded or lightly set aside. But 
the role of the court is to exercise an independent and objective judgment. If that 
judgment is in accord with that of the devoted and responsible parent, well and 
good. If it is not, then it is the duty of the court, after giving due weight to the view 
of the devoted and responsible parent, to give effect to its own judgment.27 
In this case, neither parental view should be lightly set aside, but this does not mean that 
the case becomes a simple contest of reasonableness between the two positions. Although 
the outcome will inevitably coincide with one parental view rather than the other, the 
reasoning which leads to that outcome is guided but not determined by the parental views. 
The case turns on whether or not inoculation is in L and M’s best interests.  
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The Court of Appeal decision in Re C (Welfare of Children: Immunisation)28 set out how to go 
about the best interests determination. In this case the mother’s objections were overruled 
on the basis that the benefits of vaccination outweighed the risks. At first instance, Sumner J 
first established that immunisation was in the girls’ medical interests and then went on to 
determine that there were no sufficient non-medical reasons for refusing to order the 
vaccination. The Court of Appeal (where the two-stage test was challenged) commended 
the approach.29  
Medical interests  
In F (Mother) v F (Father), neither party took the opportunity to present medical evidence: 
‘The reason why it was not taken up is because from the medical perspective the evidence 
all points one way.’30 The medical benefits of MMR inoculation, according to Theis J, were 
uncontested, which meant that she could focus on the non-medical best interests 
considerations. 
Even if the mother did not contest the medical benefits of inoculation, I would argue on the 
above assessment, that Theis J should have considered how the medical perspective applies 
to L and M’s cases in particular. After all, if the father’s application was motivated not by the 
desire to protect his children from disease, but a less generous motive, the court would 
remain free to recommend inoculation. The court’s independent assessment of best 
interests is guided by parental views. It is not a slave to them.  
However, it seems that the mother did in fact contest the medical interests. She questioned 
the lack of evidence of medical benefit for L and M.31 Furthermore, Theis J acknowledged 
the mother’s belief that if L and M do contract the diseases, their health and robust immune 
systems render them unlikely to suffer serious complications, ‘which she considers lowers 
the risk’.32  The mother got this information from an NHS website33 where it is prominently 
displayed in lay terms.34 It seems a reasonable assumption that this factor might have been 
taken into account without the need for expert medical evidence. If so, then the court might 
also have considered the following factors: 
1. Despite the fact that uptake of the MMR was adversely affected by the Lancet paper, 
herd immunity is such that L and M are unlikely to come into contact with the 
diseases.35 
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2. The relevant medical benefit concerns the balance between elevated protection 
from disease over the next 7 years (for M) and 3 years (for L) with their not being 
(fully in L’s case) inoculated for the duration of that period. Both will have the 
chance, when adults, to make an informed choice for themselves about inoculation. 
As adults, they might re-assess the risks and benefits or opt to request (or pay for) 
separate vaccines. For example, though they may later consider the rubella 
vaccination as a precursor to pregnancy, they will not necessarily benefit from that 
protection during childhood. 
3. M and L are in very different positions vis-à-vis the medical benefits that flow from 
inoculation. L has already had the first course, which gives her approximately 90% 
protection from the diseases. M, on the other hand, has no protection at all.36 
This assessment is backed up by public-facing NHS webpages on measles, mumps and 
rubella. It is comprehendible to layperson and judge. Yet the medical interests assessment 
in F (Mother) v F (Father) was judged to be no different to that in the LCC37 case.38 
Consequently it was based on the conclusion that ‘the benefits of vaccinations outweighed 
the risks’.39 
It is not my intention to revisit the debates about the safety of the MMR. There are risks 
inherent in all medical treatment and preventative measures, but the Department of Health 
has reviewed the evidence and judged the MMR safe and effective. It is worth noting, 
however, that the court is required to assess L and M’s individual medical interests whereas 
the NHS, in recommending the MMR, is concerned with both the individual risk-benefit 
ratio, and the public health benefits which flow from the minimisation or even eradication 
of disease. In short, the NHS has a (perfectly proper40) policy agenda, which it was argued in 
a previous section, is not relevant to the case of F (Mother) v F (Father). The individual view 
(of L and M’s medical interests in receiving inoculation) and the general view (that the MMR 
is safe and efficacious) can lead to very different assessments of best interests. In relation to 
15 year old L, these might be expressed in the form of two extremes: 
Extreme 1: The MMR is a safe and effective vaccine that effectively eliminates the 
risk of contracting three potentially dangerous (even fatal) diseases. 
Or 
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Extreme 2: Because the MMR is also available to adults, the court’s concern is 
limited to the benefits associated with L’s elevated immunity until the occasion of 
her 18th birthday. In the next three years, L will benefit from a mere 9% elevation in 
immunity to a disease with which she is unlikely to come into contact, but in the 
event that she does, is likely (due to her age and health) to be mild and of no lasting 
significance.  
Theis J clearly leans towards the first version of best interests. The mother’s allegation that 
medical interests of inoculation are not made out is powerless against a general rather than 
an individual assessment of medical interests.  
Another factor relevant to L and M’s medical interests that was not relevant in the LCC case, 
is the risks of inoculation that flow from its non-consensual nature.41 This might serve to 
offset the arguably minimal medical (individual) benefits of inoculation in M and 
(particularly) L’s case.  
The extent of the risk depends both on the degree to which the refusal is autonomous and 
the practical response it necessitates. L and M might accept the court’s judgment and assent 
to inoculation. If so, then arguably their medical interests are served by inoculation. The 
Child and Family Court Advisory Service report by Ms Vivian suggested that the children 
were likely to do as they were told: 
She considered these particular children to be very bright and have a lot of empathy 
and respect for their parents and would understand why decisions are made and the 
parental process.42 
But this assessment rests on the assumption that overruling a refusal of a medical 
procedure is no different to other welfare decisions where there is a parental dispute:  
She was asked about the risks to them if their wishes and feelings were overruled. 
She acknowledged there is always a risk when children are involved to this degree 
but she did not consider it any different from other welfare based decisions that do 
not accord with the wishes and feelings of the children concerned.43 
With respect, even if L and M willingly submit to the inoculation, this seems to be 
underplaying the impact of compulsory medical intervention: In YF v Turkey,44 it was stated 
that ‘a compulsory medical intervention, even if it is of minor importance, constitutes an 
interference with this [Article 8] right’. 
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On the other hand, L and M might refuse to cooperate,45 in which case the first difficulty will 
be to find a doctor willing to carry out the procedure. The doctor would be protected from a 
claim in battery by virtue of the court’s decision, but this is unlikely to remove the ethical 
concerns many doctors will have about non-consensual inoculation of older minors. The 
second problem is that a coercive invasive medical procedure is one of the most serious 
invasions of bodily autonomy sanctionable in a democratic society, despite the fact that in 
Re C (Welfare of Children: Immunisation),46 Thorpe LJ rejected the ‘repeated categorisation 
of the course of immunisation as non-essential invasive treatment. It is more correctly 
categorised as preventative healthcare’.47  If L and M were adults lacking capacity, special 
conditions would apply where restraint is necessary, including the requirement that the 
treatment is necessary to prevent harm.48 
If inoculation will have a detrimental effect on the physical and emotional wellbeing of L and 
M, this might counter the benefits of inoculation. This is a relevant factor even if L and M 
lack Gillick competence, though the stronger their capacity, the more weight should be 
given to their decision.49 
Non-medical interests 
In addition to the medical implications of non-consensual treatment, there are other, non-
medical factors relevant to the best interests assessment.  According to Re C, these would 
be considered in light of established medical benefit to determine whether there are valid 
reasons for prioritising other, non-medical benefits. 
In the two previous cases where the court was called upon to resolve a parental dispute 
about childhood vaccination, the court opted for inoculation.50 In the face of two capable 
but opposing parental views,51 the balance swung with the medical benefits of inoculation.  
This case, however, is complicated by virtue of the fact that L and M are opposed to 
inoculation. As a result, the first factor in the welfare checklist- ‘the ascertainable wishes 
and feelings of the child concerned (considered in the light of his age and understanding)’52 -
comes into play. This factor is relevant both to the medical benefits of inoculation versus the 
harmful medical consequences of non-consensual inoculation, and the non-medical 
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implications which flow from the UK’s agreement to abide by the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. Article 12(1) states: 
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views 
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of 
the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the 
child. 
Theis J did not apply the Gillick competence test, but did articulate reasons for doubting the 
autonomy of their decisions. Had she decided otherwise, the outcome might have been very 
different. Whilst the court has the inherent jurisdiction to overrule a competent minor, 
three factors mitigate against non-consensual inoculation. First, the contentious decision of 
Re R53 in which Lord Donaldson asserted that parents or the court could consent even where 
a competent minor withholds consent, related to life-sustaining treatment. It is 
questionable whether the same principle would apply to preventative medicine. Second, 
Silber J in R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health54suggested that parents lose any rights 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to control their child’s medical 
treatment once that child becomes competent. This suggests an increased relevance of 
decisional autonomy of competent minors.55 Third, it would conflict with Government 
policy. The NHS advice on the HPV vaccine given to 12-13 year old girls to protect against 
the two viruses that cause over 70% of cervical cancer, allows competent minors to refuse 
the vaccination, whatever the reason:  
What if she doesn’t want to have the vaccination? 
She doesn’t have to have it, if she doesn’t want to. 
But it is recommended that she does for the reasons given above. Having the 
vaccination now will protect her for many years. Suggest she speaks to the nurse or 
doctor if she wants more information, on her own, or with you, if she’d prefer.56 
In F (Mother) v F (Father), Theis J considered the views of L and M in accordance with Article 
12(2) of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.  However it is less clear that the 
judgment complies with the Article 12(1) requirement that ‘due weight’ is given to the view 
of the children. 
The context must not be ignored. L and M’s parents separated in 2009 and divorced in 2013. 
The inoculation dispute might, under different circumstances, have been resolved amicably. 
Presented with a united front, the daughters might have complied with whatever decision 
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their parents made. If this is the full extent of the problem, then Theis J offers a solution. 
The judicial determination of best interests may be enough to persuade the mother to 
change her position in which case, assuming the court is right about her level of influence, 
the daughters will follow suit. Even if the mother maintains her position, L and M, caught in 
the cross fire of a parental dispute, have the justification they need to accept the father’s 
opinion, free of the guilt that might otherwise accompany this decision.   
But, as we saw above, it is also possible that L and M really do have a strong desire not to be 
inoculated. Theis J decided that both minors’ views were insufficiently balanced, did not 
give sufficient weight to the positive side of immunisation and were swayed by the strong 
views of their mother.  
The girls’ wishes is, of course an important factor, particularly bearing in mind their 
ages but the court also has to consider their level of understanding of the issues 
involved and what factors have influenced their views.57 
The court relied on apparent misconceptions made by L and M as evidence of their lack of 
understanding. Ms Vivian report relayed the girls’ naivety concerning measles:  
When asked by Ms Vivian how they would get better if they became ill with one of 
the vaccine preventing diseases M responded they would go to the doctor and get 
medicine and get better. … L wondered whether they would get treated as the 
doctors may be scared of getting it too. They said they knew people who had had 
measles and they ‘only get a rash’.58 
If this view is indeed evidence of naivety (a position I will shortly question), it is concerning 
that the seriousness of the diseases was not explained to L and M in order to give them an 
opportunity to reflect upon and reconsider their positions. L and M’s abilities to reach 
reasoned decisions regarding inoculation (albeit decisions which did not necessarily bind the 
court) were not facilitated. Theis J said:  
[Ms Vivian] considers they have had access to information that they have researched 
themselves and she does not consider they have obtained a full and proper picture … 
She did not consider they had any rounded appreciation of the pros and cons of the 
vaccine and as a result there should be some caution before attaching significant 
weight to their wishes and feelings.59 
One option would have been to furnish the minors with this information before assessing 
their views and their relevance. Were L a few months older, an assessor of their capacity 
would be required to facilitate their decision-making according to section 1(3) of the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 which states:  
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A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable 
steps to help him to do so have been taken without success. 
The Act does not apply to L and M, who are under the age of 16, but Andrew McFarlane has 
expressed the desirability of extending the same facilitative approach to minors.60 
Furthermore, Article 13 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child respects the child’s 
right ‘to freedom of expression … [including] freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers… .’ Had the assessment of L and 
M’s understanding been facilitative, their views (whether for or against inoculation) might 
have taken on additional significance.61 The fact that the flaws in the minors’ understanding 
might have been remedied is not taken into account in F (Mother) v F (Father). 
The supposed naivety of their views is also questionable. First, L and M’s focus on the 
negatives of inoculation is hardly surprising given that the minors rejected inoculation. Had 
they expressed views both for and against inoculation, would it not have been easy to 
overrule them on the basis that they were undecided?  
Second, L (a vegan) objected to the gelatine content of the vaccine.62 In an adult this might 
have been seen as evidence of a thoughtful and considered approach – of an objection to 
the vaccine which goes beyond the disputed concerns about its safety following the Lancet 
article and press campaign. An absolutist moral stance would not be taken as evidence of 
incapacity.63 In the short judgment, the fact that L did not know or enquire as to the 
ingredients of any treatments for measles, mumps and rubella was mentioned 3 times.64 It 
was acknowledged that L and M had done some of their own research on the internet. Yet a 
perusal of the NHS webpages designed to inform the public on the symptoms, treatments 
and complications associated with measles, mumps and rubella reveal that there is no 
treatment for these conditions. L was quite right then to assume both that a doctor treating 
such a contagious condition might be concerned about infection (L of all people knows that 
not everyone has been inoculated) and that gelatine or other animal products is unlikely to 
be administered in any necessary treatment, because no such treatment exists. It seems 
that a higher level of understanding was required than the NHS expect of the readers of 
their webpages. Whilst Lord Scarman required that in order to be viewed Gillick competent, 
minors should ‘understand fully what is proposed’,65 this would take the level of 
understanding required of L and M beyond that required when an adult consents to or 
refuses treatment. A similarly high threshold in the much-criticised case of Re E (A minor) 
(Wardship: Medical treatment)66 resulted in academic criticism.67  
                                                          
60
 A. McFarlane, ‘Mental Capacity: One Standard for All Ages’ [2011] 41 Fam Law 479. 
61
 E. Cave, ‘Maximisation of a Minors’ Capacity’ (2011) 4 Child and Family Law Quarterly 429. 
62
 [2013] EWHC 2683 (Fam), at [13-15], 
63
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, ss 1(4) and 2(3). 
64
 Ibid, at [13], [15] and [22]. 
65
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66
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Conclusions 
Neither party produced expert medical evidence. Arguably it was not needed given the 
undisputed medical evidence that the vaccine is safe and effective in preventing potentially 
serious diseases. On the other hand, the mother’s dissatisfaction with the lack of evidence 
of medical benefit is not limited to the (undisputed) risk of side effects and (disputed) safety 
concerns over the MMR.  I have argued that the relevant assessment is not the safety and 
efficacy of the vaccine, but the balance between the medical benefits of inoculation in L and 
M’s case in particular and welfare considerations which flow from non-consensual 
inoculation. I have further argued that the court might have made such an assessment 
without the aid of expert medical evidence. It is therefore arguable that exaggerated 
prominence was given to the medical benefits of inoculation in this case.  
This factor should be considered in conjunction with the arguably unfair presentation of 
their views as unbalanced and unfocused68 and the failure to facilitate L and M’s capacity to 
make a decision about inoculation. This is lamentable. Children’s rights should be no less 
relevant because the dispute originated between their parents.  
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